Translation
Original language
28.05.2026

MIGRATION: GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND NEW ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES

MIGRATION: GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND NEW ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES

According to the International Organization for Migration, the number of international migrants is projected to surpass 281 million by 2024, accounting for 3.6% of the world’s population. Key drivers include global demographic shifts, climate change, geopolitical tensions, and rapid population ageing in both developed and developing nations. In this context, migration serves as one of the most effective tools for achieving long-term sustainable development, yet it also generates significant socioeconomic challenges.
The immediate downsides are extensively documented and often spark public debate. Large inflows of refugees and low-skilled migrants drive up costs for social welfare, healthcare, education, and housing. For instance, Germany faced annual net budgetary expenses of €20–25 billion for refugee reception and integration between 2015 and 2020. A sudden surge in low-skilled labour supply can depress wages for non-college-educated local workers by 1–5% in the short term and elevate unemployment among vulnerable populations. Migrant concentrations, cultural disparities, and competition for public resources further intensify social frictions, fuelling xenophobia and demands for stricter policies.
That said, the majority of empirical research points to positive long-term economic benefits from migration. Working-age immigrants represent the primary solution to countering demographic ageing. Per the UN’s median projections, Germany would need an annual net inflow of 400,000–500,000 people to sustain its current labour force size through 2050. Immigrants — and particularly their children — bring heightened innovative capacity (with 45% of U.S. patents from 2010–2020 featuring at least one immigrant co-author) and exhibit 1.5–2.5 times greater entrepreneurial drive than native-born individuals.

Throughout their lifetimes, immigrants deliver substantial fiscal contributions to developed economies, with even greater impacts from their second-generation descendants. Global evidence demonstrates that targeted organizational strategies can minimize downsides while amplifying benefits. Canada’s Express Entry points system secures skilled jobs for 70–80% of economic immigrants within their first year, fuelling 2–3% of annual GDP growth from immigration. Australia tackles overheated labour markets in big cities via selective immigration and mandatory regional resettlement. Post-2015–2016 crisis, Germany rolled out robust integration programmes and dual vocational training, achieving over 65% refugee employment by 2024 and positive net fiscal returns within 7–8 years. Sweden and Denmark prioritize rapid labour market entry through ‘fast-track’ initiatives and compulsory 37-hour integration contracts.
Japan’s restrictive immigration approach merits close attention. Until 2019, it enforced one of the OECD’s strictest policies amid the world’s fastest-ageing population (median age 49, with a dependency ratio projected to surpass 100% by 2050). The fallout has been dire: acute labour shortages in manufacturing, construction, agriculture, and caregiving sectors. Since 2019, Japan has embarked on gradual immigration liberalization. Acknowledging the demographic crisis, Tokyo has tentatively welcomed foreign workers by sharply increasing quotas for technical trainees, introducing the Specified Skilled Worker (SSW) programme for semi-skilled roles, and piloting regional immigration initiatives. By 2025, the goal is to onboard up to 820,000 foreign workers across 14 high-demand sectors, including construction, elderly care, agriculture, and shipbuilding. Tokyo enforces a strict ‘revolving door’ model: stays are capped at contract lengths (up to 5 years for SSW-1 and 10 years for SSW-2, with possible extensions but no automatic path to permanent residency or citizenship). The government rigorously oversees working conditions, wages, and social protections to mitigate social and cultural risks.
This balanced strategy has enabled Japan to ease acute labour shortages and slow down production declines in critical sectors. Yet it falls short of solving the core issue: irreversible long-term demographic drop. Japanese Cabinet Office projections (2024) indicate that even with all new programmes fully implemented, net immigration will meet just 30–35% of annual labour force requirements. As a result, potential GDP shrinks by 0.5–0.7 percentage points yearly — despite Japan’s status as one of the world’s most technologically advanced and efficiently managed economies.

Japan thus exemplifies the high cost of excessive caution. Nations treating migration as a strategic asset, rather than a threat — investing in selection, language and skills training, and regional dispersal (e.g., Canada, Australia, Germany post 2016-2022 reforms, and Scandinavia) — gain not merely workers, but a rejuvenated population, fresh innovation, and enduring growth.
In the 21st century, global competition hinges not on oil, land, or even technology alone — but on people ready and able to work and innovate. Nations that foster environments where talented, hardworking individuals from any background choose to arrive, remain, and build brighter futures for their children will dominate tomorrow. Those clinging to ideological, political, or inertial barriers — limiting access even temporarily — will steadily fall behind. History’s lesson is clear: amid worldwide population ageing, no surer route to prosperity exists than attracting and harnessing human potential from wherever it arises.

References:
1) Borjas G. The Economics of Immigration // Journal of Economic Literature. — 2016. — Vol. 54, № 4. — С. 1233–1299. (Borjas G. J. The Labor Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market).
2) Bundesrechnungshof. Bericht zur Integration von Flüchtlingen: Finanzielle Auswirkungen 2015–2020. — Bonn, 2021.
3) Cabinet Office Japan. Annual Report on the Japanese Economy and Public Finance 2024. — Tokyo, 2024.
4) Dustmann C., Schönberg U., Stuhler J. Labor Supply Shocks, Native Wages, and the Adjustment of Local Labor Markets // Quarterly Journal of Economics. — 2023. — Vol. 138, № 1.
5) Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB). Integration von Geflüchteten auf dem deutschen Arbeitsmarkt: Stand 2024. — Nürnberg, 2024.
6) International Organization for Migration (IOM). World Migration Report 2024. — Geneva: IOM, 2024.
7) Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC). Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration 2024. — Ottawa, 2024.
8) Kerr W. R., Kerr S. P. Immigrant Entrepreneurship in America: Evidence from the Survey of Business Owners // Research Policy. — 2020. — Vol. 49, № 3.
9) Kerr W. R. et al. High-Skilled Migration and Innovation // Handbook of the Economics of International Migration. — 2023.
10) National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration. — Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2017 (updated estimates 2023).
11) OECD. International Migration Outlook 2023. — Paris: OECD Publishing, 2023.
12) Peri G. Immigrants, Productivity, and Labor Markets // Journal of Economic Perspectives. — 2016. — Vol. 30, № 4. — С. 3–30.
13) United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. World Population Prospects 2024: Summary of Results. — New York: UN, 2024.
Read full text
Bozarov Mikhail
Uzbekistan
Bozarov Mikhail
Teacher of SDGs and Humanities International Agriculture University