Multipolar World and Globalization’s New Rules
The world is undergoing a profound reallocation of territory, populations, and economic resources. Major powers are pursuing ambitious expansions: the U.S. eyes Greenland and Canada once again; the EU seeks to draw in Canada and Ukraine, [1] reintegrate the UK, and form its own military independent of NATO; Türkiye aims to unite with Azerbaijan and Central Asia’s Turkic states (the "Great Turan") by dominating the Transcaucasus; Russia works to reclaim Soviet-era geopolitical sway; China pushes for Taiwan reunification, South China Sea island-building, and deeper ties with Indochina, Southeast Asia, Mongolia, and Central Asia; India constructs a military base on Mauritius’s North Agalega Island in the Indian Ocean while strengthening bonds with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. These moves signal a global redivision, amplifying the influence of great powers and regional blocs. Similar, though slower, dynamics are unfolding in Latin America, Africa, and the Arab world.
The old economic order no longer satisfies most nations. Established leaders consolidate resources — even at the cost of their allies — to hold their ground, while rising powers seize opportunities in emerging territories and markets. The globalization model shaped by the West in the 1980s–1990s has unravelled. Developing nations adeptly harnessed its benefits, emerging as formidable economic rivals and prompting a resource shift in production, technology, finance, and — crucially — human capital. In response, the West pushes for ‘controlled’ globalization with revised rules. The Global South counters with multipolarity and multifaceted integration, positioning megaregions as the dominant forces in a ‘new’ global order. Yet globalization remains unavoidable amid planetary crises like environmental degradation, climate change, overpopulation, and scarce minerals. Cooperation among these megaregions offers an efficient path forward.
Meanwhile, a major shift of resources among megaregions is accelerating. Over the past decade (January 2015 – January 2025), U.S. indices outperformed: the Dow Jones rose 2.5-fold (from 17,374 to 42,687[2]), NASDAQ surged 4.2-fold (from 4,634 to 19,578), and S&P 500 grew threefold (from 1,992 to 5,932). In contrast, British FTSE increased just 1.2-fold (6,949 to 8,499[3]), German DAX 1.7-fold (12,000 to 20,350), French CAC 40 1.6-fold (4,552 to 7,445[4]), and Japan’s Nikkei 2.3-fold (18,284 to 41,715). This signals trillions of dollars flowing from the EU, UK, and Japan into the U.S. economy.
The crisis persists, with divergent growth rates — especially among developed nations — highlighting a power and resources redistribution in the global economy. Yet slowing worldwide GDP growth shows this process is inefficient, generating more challenges than benefits.
During the post-crisis years 2010–2024, global GDP's resource intensity rose despite soaring mineral prices. Our analysis identifies mounting national debt as the key driver of escalating growth costs, particularly domestic debt. For instance, the UK’s hit 102.6% of GDP in 2022; the U.S. exceeded $36 trillion in 2024 (133% of GDP). Total debt swelled across these nations, reaching $307 trillion globally by 2025.
The world has segmented into three distinct blocs: the first, centred on IT, AI, and finance (USA, Japan, World Bank, EU, Canada, Australia); the second, focused on raw materials and military technology (Russia, Arab countries, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Venezuela, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan); and the third, providing labour (Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, Eritrea, Palestine, Lebanon, Armenia, Pakistan, the Philippines, India, Bangladesh, etc.). India is also staking its claim as a technological leader.
Financiers aim to draw resources from raw materials producers while controlling essential labour supplies. Raw materials producers, struggling to counter financiers directly, pull labour from the world’s most underdeveloped nations. These tensions manifest as cascading, regional confrontations. For instance, the EU draws from its own raw materials sources (Norway, the Netherlands, North Africa, Poland, etc.) and labour reserves (Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Moldova, Syria, Libya). The United States taps its own suppliers (the Arabian Peninsula, Mexico) and workforce (Latin America, the Philippines, post-Soviet states). Russia relies on its labour pool (Ukrainians, Armenians, Moldovans, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, and others) and supportive ecosystems.
Some nations (China, India, Türkiye, Brazil, South Africa, Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, and the ‘Asian Dragons’) have secured the capacity for standard economic operations: producing and marketing conventional goods and services. They function as elite players, exporting labour while importing resources (raw materials and workers) from developing economies to drive technological progress. Western countries work to channel this group’s expansion onto the backs of weaker, more fragile developing markets. In reality, these countries exert the most positive influence on global economic stability.
Advancing the global economy demands a fairer allocation of key resources — land, capital, labour, innovation, and raw materials. Ongoing redistribution of these factors represents the sole path to sustained global growth. In megaeconomics, economic factors naturally seek equilibrium defined by:
MPL/PC = MPC/Cf=MPR/Rex = MPI/Iv (1)
where:
MPL is the world’s marginal product of labour,
PC is global private consumption,
MPC is the marginal product of capital,
Cf is capital efficiency (or income),
MPR is the marginal product of resources,
Rex is resource sales revenue,
MPI is the marginal product of innovation, and
Iv is innovation revenue.
This equilibrium makes labour mobility (migration) far simpler and more cost-effective than shifting capital, technology, goods, or services: capital rarely moves to people; instead, people gravitate toward capital and technology. Surging global population and literacy have boosted human mobility, paving the way for new labour equilibria. Our research shows a clear 21st-century shift: human resources flow to capital, raw materials, and tech hubs, not the reverse. Today, 28–33 million people migrate yearly — over one-third of annual global population growth.
Returning to megaregions and formula (1) above, how do they play out in practice? As this shift to megaregions is emerging, established models don’t yet apply — but key theoretical and practical conclusions can be made.
First, on the role and scale of these new global actors: megaregions must boast abundant mineral resources, span at least 3 million square kilometres, house 350–400 million people, and generate $15 trillion+ in GDP (PPP).
Second, interactions among megaregions follow the principles of formula (1). For instance, despite its larger population (450.4 million as of 1 January 2025), the EU requires more workers than the U.S. (342 million), primarily due to lower labour productivity. Thus, despite apparent anti-immigration stances, Europe needs immigrants and affordable labour to boost competitiveness and cut production costs. The U.S. economy similarly demands fresh labour inflows, driven by its heavy reliance on services — especially finance — where productivity gains are constrained. The ‘Russia’ megaregion must also vie for immigrant workers, given its lagging technological base; here, the focus is less on volume and more on skilled talent. Rich in minerals, however, it will need to trade raw materials for technology in coming years to achieve formula (1) equilibrium.
Figure 1: Share Dynamics of Select Political-Economic Blocs in Global GDP, 1980–2023 (Forecast to 2028) [5]
Global South nations — endowed with abundant human capital, solid raw material reserves, and growing technological capabilities — stand to outpace G7 and G20 countries in the coming years (see Fig. 1). Among megaregions, their primary rival will likely be the ‘USA’ megaregion (the Anglo-Saxon sphere). Rising mineral shortages (key reserves depleting in 50–80 years), global warming, and environmental pressures will demand fresh cooperation models across megaregions, fundamentally reshaping globalization's character.
[1] Why Canada should Join the EU // The Economist, 2nd January 2025, https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/01/02/why-canada-should-join
the-eu?utm_content=ed-picks-image-link-1&etear=nl_today_1&utm_
campaign=r.the-economist-today&utm_medium=email.internal
newsletter.np&utm_source=salesforce-marketing-cloud&utm_term=1/2/2025&utm_id=2024558
[2] CNN Business, https://edition.cnn.com/markets
[3] Monthly development FTSE All-Share Index 2015-2025. URL:
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1214039/monthly-development-ftse-all
share-index/
[4] France's CAC 40 stock index closed higher, gaining 0.59%, URL:
https://ru.investing.com/news/stock-market-news/article-2615703.
[5] The Economist, 19-25 August 2023, p.51.
