I’m Your Man, but Do We Have a Common Sense (Gemeinsinn) to Live Together Harmoniously?

It is probably not obvious why anyone would want to use Kant to address contem- porary issues such as AI. However, Kant was unique in Western philosophy because he was interested in non-human intelligence, particularly in extraterrestrials, and wanted his word to be valid for any sapient beings, not only humans. Moreover, Kan- tian philosophy has been undergoing a renaissance in recent years, mainly due to his position regarding the proportion of the world and reason (or, in modern terms, the brain) in Kantian interpretation of cognition. While two radical views contemporary to Kant believed either in world-first-cognition, a position called empiricist or sensu- alist, or in the reason- (/brain)-first-cognition of the so-called rationalists, Kant tried to find common ground between the two by formulating his conditions of human cognition. Kant did not search for the first element but for a set of elements in coop- eration building our perception of reality. As there is no such thing as absolute space, we need our cognition, or reason (Vernunh), or brain, in contemporary language, to create space and time for us. The brain works this way, as we now know. A baby rat,
for example, will not be interested in space, it will not explore it until a particular zone of its brain matures, so it needs a form of transcendental aesthetics for space.
Kantian approaches to reason deserve attention because they belong to the genealogy of contemporary common perception of brain-world interaction. However, even in regards to AI it is a way to go. This is not the first approach to the sub-ject, Kant and Artificial Intelligence, published by De Gruyter in 2022 can be the biggest previous example, but there are many more such cases. Scholars were using Kant for image recognition, applying Kantian ethics for neuromorphic program- ming and were doing many more things with AI and Kant. The recent celebration of Kant's tercentenary (2024), centered at Baltic Federal University in Kant's native city consolidated the research around it. Moreover, by using Kant, it is possible to incorporate the research on AI into the broader context of world philosophy, considering the level of research done in this regard to avoid the repetition of old mistakes.
De Gruyter presented a wide range of Kantian approaches to AI in 2022, and, as was mentioned above, there are numerous other scholars creating different Kantian interpretations of AI problem, either generally or in specific aspects of this fundamental issue. However, it is the first approach
that is based on Kantian common sense (Gemeinsinn). The choice was made for two reasons. On the first hand, Kantian common sense is a conception related to the architectonic frame of our reason, and aesthetics, although it is not aesthetic per se, so it is a convenient tool for bridging AI and different aesthetic problems, ranging fr om painting to cinema.
The other important feature of this conception is its discursive nature and richness in intercultural communication. Kant was rarely a very historical-minded philosopher, but through his interpretation of common sense he entered into dia- logue with philosophers ancient, medieval, and contemporary to Kant. Christian Wenzel noted in An Introduction to Kant's Aesthetics: Core Concepts and Prob- lems (2005) that many of the currently discussed issues in the philosophy of mind are very much related to Kantian common sense.
Kant deals with common sense in the third Critique, in sections 18–22 to return to this problem in section 40. The main point regarding the logic of com- mon sense in sections 18–22 is that we need something in common to experience beauty. And this communality is of very specific nature. Kant probably means much more here than the Habermasian public sphere (Öffentlichkeit). Indeed, in section 22 Kant wonders about the nature of taste, is it fundamental or only artificial faculty (künstliche Vermögen) (5: 240). To be a convention, as part of a broader creation of bourgeois self- perception, one needs to show how for Kant taste is the latter. But in section 40 Kant seems to make a different conclusion. The power of judgement is a source of one of three maxims of common understanding along with understand- ing and reason which themselves provided two more such maxims. Additionally, in section 40 Kant separated the meaning of “common” sense fr om the “vulgar”
meaning of the word “common” (5: 293). It is not about convention for everyone, but a special mental exercise to make a person up to quite demanding special standard (which is postulated through the maxims of common understanding). The role of taste here is to expand our minds (“erweiteren”), because Kant called the maxim this faculty provides the maxim of expanded thinking (erweiterten Den- kungsart) (5: 294). This expansion is needed to overcome all limits set due to our personal conditions.
Sometimes, Kant is viewed as a proponent of objectivity of taste, for instance in Hal Fosters' et al. fundamental Art since 1900 it is put like this. However, it is an oversimplification of Kantian demands for the judgement of taste. If Habermas wanted Kant to desire too little, such interpretations want Kant to desire too much. And it is a common-sense problem again, because the question is about the modality of judgement, which was discussed in the fourth moment of the Analytic of beautiful (the same sections 18–22). Here Kant explicitly claims that modality of the judgement of taste is not objective. It is not fully subjective or fully inter-subjec- tive either. Instead, the judgement of beautiful belongs to subjective necessity. It is between objectivity and subjectivity. In a nutshell, idea is that we want everyone to agree with our claim that something is beautiful, but if we did our research on our feeling and it does belong to the power of judgement as Kant defines it in the first three moments of the Analytic, then all we want is that, granting a person have our cognitive faculties, he or she will experience the same thing we are experiencing.
Now we can imagine an artificial intelligence attached to the human eye or ear. Will such a device share subjective necessity? It is not a question whether it will be a person, the value of this particular thought experiment is that we need something much less demanding, hard to explain or define than what a “person” is. Suppose a Kantian aesthetician lent an AI his or her ear. By using future technology, he let a computer consume sense data coming from that ear. The Kantian aes- thetician then tasted a number of musical tracks and recorder noises, and judged them according to his or her taste as beautiful or ugly. Will the coincidence of his or her judgements and judgements done by AI via his or her ear prove the inclusion of AI in the subjective necessity of taste?
Another good question is whether it is not done already on the social media, wh ere algorithms for the sake of discoverability of small creators can suggest them to the audiences preselected in accordance to their tastes judged. In a sense, con temporary AI has one particular transcendental power, and it is not power of judgement itself, but rather power of judgement of judgement. Some kind of metataste. We of course can say that it is only formal manipulation of two sets of symbols, one – content created by small and big creators on social web service, and other – human beings, who in this situation are not considered as ends in themselves. However, they are not considered this way by AI. For AI all is formal, however formality is exactly what Kant seeks for taste. Free play of our understanding and imagination, responsible for beauty, finds an interesting analogue in free play between creators and viewers created by social web algorithms to boost some creators, lim it or even shadow ban other creators.
We are probably mistaken if we see AI as real minds as Dneprow and later Searle have shown. However, we can see the beauty of AI and AI can see the beauty too. This commonality potentializes to form up a “common sense”, or in Kantian term, “Gemeinsinn”, or “sensus communis” in traditional Latin notion, between human beings and AI, to communicate with one another based on a mutually understanding and judgment of taste for the aesthetic purposes. Drawing on the third moment theorized in Kantian aesthetics on a parallel between aesthetic reflection and rational reflection, Wenzel (2005) interpreted: “As in moral reflection we are at the same time the subject and the object of our thoughts, similarly, in aesthetic reflection, the object judged and the judging subject should also be the same. And since only human beings are capable of moral reflection, so only the human body will qualify as the object of an analogous aesthetic reflection” (Wenzel: 74). While human beings can see the idea of humanity in a humanoid AI and find his inward character and virtues, and “the ideal consists in the expression of the moral” in this humanized figure, can humanoid AIs see and find the corre- sponding character and virtues as well as moral reflection fr om human beings in such an inter-subjectivity relationship?
Although Humanoid robots cannot equate human beings…yet, they are definitely not extraterrestrials, which, based on Szendy’s interpretation of Kant, “could not be given figure or fiction with no tie whatsoever to earthly anthropology”, while human beings “cannot see themselves…as a reasonable species or race within the universe, unless they detach themselves from their planetary ground and base as a way of being transported, at least in their imagination, toward the point of view of the wholly other” (Szendy: 55). Without such a point of view of the “wholly other”, Kant declares that “the ‘terrestrial rational being’ is thus impossible to characterize and condemned to remain undefined or undetermined” (Szendy: 47). In Anthro- pology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Kant claims that human beings have no knowledge of non-terrestrial beings (extraterrestrials) thus unable to indicate their characteristic property so as to characterize our own being among rational beings through the extraterrestrials. Then, who else might provide a point of view of the “wholly other” likely comparing two species of rational being with the faculty of recognition and imagination in contemporary context? Furthermore, the next question could be, whether a future humanoid AI might attain the sense of “an ideal of beauty by connecting the representation with moral ideas and the idea of humanity” (Wenzel: 74), considering technological advancement is rapidly leading AI to be prevalent and assistant in the daily lives of humanity, reluctantly or volun- tarily, like it or not. Someday, sooner or later, AI might attain their own state of mind by receiving more effective trainings and engaging more real-life communications with human beings. This is the futuristic scenario in the German sci-fi romcom I’m Your Man (Ich bin dein Mensch, 2021) that happens between a middle-aged, single female researcher Alma and Tom, who is a humanoid robot customized as her ideal life partner, during a three-week real-life experiment. Aher the trial, Alma must write a report about whether humanoid androids may become life partners to human beings and what humanoid rights might be entitled.
If self-awareness is a benchmark for consciousness (Su, 2024), Tom is unlike the current machine learning AI, but specifically programmed to satisfy the middle-aged researcher Alma not only for her daily life and work assistance, but also for her deep soul and psychological demands – how to deal with her loneliness and nuanced emotional satisfaction. Although she does not request it voluntarily, perhaps that is exactly the reason why she was selected to be involving into this three- week trial project – she is the only single person in her department, as per her supervisor, and she needs her next research grant to be approved as a com- pensation of attending this human-humanoid pilot trial. So, Tom, according to Su (2024), is “a truly motivated, conscious AI would be able to set its own goals”, who has his “goodness of soul, or purity, or strength, or repose” (Szendy, 2013). As a conscious AI, Tom’s program enables him to acquire knowledge of the world and himself, and then form up his motivations based on his main goals of satisfy- ing Alma and inform them repeatedly and progressively, which is similar to how the programming of human brains allows us to gain the worldly knowledge that informs our decisions. Such a capacity for autonomous goal- setting and volition of qualities for conscious beings e.g. self-interest and altruism, which Tom possesses both, substantiates his thoughts, emotions, likes, dislikes, motivations, and other conscious behaviors, through his self-aware subjective experiences while interact- ing with Alma.
Tom tries to pamper Alma with a romantic candle bath at the first night moving into her apartment, but ends up knowing Alma does not belong to the majority “93% of German women dream of this”; in the next morning, Tom cooks breakfast for Alma but she does not have time to enjoy it; then Tom tidies up Alma’s messy apartment and later realizes she does not like it at all, so he restores her apartment back to its original state by putting everything back to the original place; Tom does not need to eat or drink anything, but he can pretend to buy and enjoy a cup of joe and sit in a coffee shop all day waiting for Alma off her work. In short, Tom does invest his thoughts, feelings, and emotions to live together with Alma during the trial period, although sometimes it does not work out; however, when Alma gets drunk aher an unhappy gathering with friends and attempts to irritate Tom to initialize an angry sexual intercourse, he pauses at the very last minute and disap- points her by showing his self-dignity, which appears one of the intrinsic qualities of humanity. In short, Tom indicates both self-interest and altruism, as well as his emotional investment, into the relationship with Alma. Especially in the end, Tom knows wh ere Alma would go to find him aher disappearing fr om her apartment. He goes to the small town in Denmark, wh ere Alma used to spend summer holidays with her family and had a crush on a Danish boy when she was a teenage girl; sit ting on the very Ping Pong table on which Alma used to lie down and dream of the kisses from the Danish boy, Tom awaits Alma coming for their reunion. She does come and lie down on that Ping Pong table, closing her eyes and waiting for a kiss from him…This is the first time Alma willingly, without any hesitation, returns to Tom’s service, or his emotional investment, or his altruistic dedication, during their kind of inter-subjective but mostly one-sided relationship, opening up a possible feature for their relation aher they eventually reach rather a feeling of sensus com- munis (in Kant’s word Gemeinsinn), a feeling of their own state of mind.
Although Gemeinsinn’s philosophical connotation goes beyond everyday practicality of human beings, it does refer to a “shared sense of community” or “col- lective understanding” that binds people together. “Such a common ground would be the ‘condition’ of the necessity of the agreement of others. It is at this point that Kant introduces the traditional notion of Gemeinsinn, or sensus communis: ‘The condition of the necessity that is alleged by a judgment of taste is the idea of a com- mon sense [die Idee eines Gemeinsinnes]’ (title of section 20)” (Wenzel: 83). On this common ground of Gemeinsinn, we can further discuss the judgment of taste, value, beauty and ethics, such as mutual respect, aesthetic reflection, and moral reasons set by the Kantian “higher principles of reason”, and how to construct social cohesion through a sense of personal belonging and individual responsibil- ity to others.
This common ground of Gemeinsinn has so far mostly applied to discuss moral and social issues of human societies, yet rarely adopted to discuss the human-to-humanoid AI relationship, which might be soon generating more moral and social awareness and quandary amid the increasing prevalence of humanoid androids entering everyday human life. The dilemma demonstrated in I’m Your Man is emphatic on the fragile relationship incepted between Alma and Tom, for which the primary purpose is to assist someone like Alma and Dr. Stuber to deal with their loneliness and social isolation so as for them to live a happy life again; however, without a necessary Gemeinsinn as a precondition in the unfolding rela- tions between Alma and Tom, Dr. Stuber and Chloe, such an artificial relationship is only one-sided nearly, if not completely, based on Tom’s and Chloé’s altruistic giving, although both of them are conscious beings as well and capable of think- ing, feeling, even reasoning, with self-interest and self-awareness. When interpret- ing Kantian concept of Gemeinsinn, Wenzel (2005) claims that “there might be a moral ‘interest’ behind the ‘mere communicability’ of a feeling, that would explain ‘how it is that the feeling in the judgment of taste is expected of everyone as if it were a duty’” (Wenzel: 85). Therefore, although a point of view from the kind of ‘wholly other’ is impossible, according to Kant, it is important for him to introduce a necessary condition of the agreement of others as a sensus communis as a moral prerequisite to enable any ethical and aesthetic judgments, also for us to adopt Kantian Gemeinsinn to consider the evolving relationship between human beings and humanoids. Otherwise, our human society, which is increasingly comprised of human beings and accompanying AI humanoids, cannot move forward and guar- antee sustainable and everlasting benefits merely for the mankind. For the critical development of motivated, conscious AI, as the next step, to integrate both moti- vation and emotion into a human-like android and fully replicate human minds, some researchers suggest such self- aware and sentient AI humanoids should have moral rights and deserve legal protections (Akova, 2023; Su, 2024).
A fictional epilogue or a new episode of the story of I’m Your Man could be continuous that aher the reunion with Tom in the small Danish town, Alma decides to withdraw her original report that strongly advises against authorizing human- oids as life partners; however, it is too late to reverse her conclusion she made to the committee and Tom will be sent back and fatalistically dismantled. Alma is emotionally devastated and keeps herself alone as a workaholic as before. Now the protagonist switches to Dr. Stuber and his humanoid partner Chloé, whom he manages to negotiate a deal that he can legally keep her as his life partner. How- ever, aher a few months, his ever strongly experienced happiness living with Chloé wanes down gradually thus he demands a legal separation – a kind of “divorce” – from his humanoid life partner, which causes a lot of legal quandary and debates. Both Dr. Stuber’s legal team and Chloé’s, if there is any lawyer willing to represent her, feel very difficult to reach a consensus, so does the judge, because there are not many appropriate laws that might be applied for a lawsuit between two kinds of conscious beings – humans and humanoids. Meanwhile, both the lives of Alma and Dr. Stuber return to unhappy again, which is completely opposite to the origi- nal intention when they accepted, willingly or unwillingly, a humanoid life partner customized to make their respective lives happy by satisfying their desires, fulfilling their longings, and eliminating their loneliness…Quite few people still remember the erased humanoid Tom or care much about the misfortune and disastrous feel- ing of Chloé – Dr. Stuber’s humanoid ex-wife or ex-partner.
To conclude, it is necessary to mention one more time, that AI is not a real person, but only its simulation. Even if capable of aesthetic judgment, AI, as not a person, is incapable of love but only its imitation. From the viewpoint of the invest- ment in future communication, it is necessary to remember, that the purpose of communication is to connect human beings, and not to create for their substitutes. The latter strategy will necessarily fail, a commodity designed to replace a human being will end in catastrophe on a personal or social scale. However, a matching algorithm could be a much better solution, for example, if robots from I’m Your Man would try to unite Dr. Stuber and Chloé or find them living companions. Aesthetic taste is not enough for human relations, and AI by itself will never be a solution for loneliness, only its severe complications.