Navigating Complex Security Landscapes: ASEAN’s Role in the Age of Digital Diplomacy, Great Power Competition, and the Shihing Global Order

The complexity of security in today’s increasingly volatile global landscape is challenging the established New World Order. The rise of China as a political and economic powerhouse through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has made signif- icant inroads in Africa, Europe, and Asia, particularly within ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). The gathering of Global South states in the form of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) presents an alternative to the Washington Consensus that has traditionally positioned the US as the hegemonic leader. This shih has compelled nation-states like Malaysia to reevaluate their tra- ditional foreign policy stances.
In 2025, as Malaysia assumes the chairmanship of ASEAN, the question of promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development—aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals—makes human security an increas- ingly important theme requiring attention from academics, scholars, and policy- makers. As Barry Buzan (2008) articulates in his seminal work, human security is increasingly under threat from both state and non-state actors as a consequence of decisions made by political, bureaucratic, and economic elites that govern nation-

states, placing their constituents at risk. We can observe examples of this in the decisions made by Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Ukraine and, closer to home, by the military junta in Myanmar.
The Myanmar crisis extends beyond regional implications; it has created opportunities for external interventions under the pretext of protecting eco- nomic interests, particularly China’s strategic access to the Indian Ocean (Gra- ham, E., 2024). These security complexities have also facilitated the proliferation of transnational criminal activities, including scam centers that have victimized many from across the region, including Malaysians, Filipinos, and Thais. Addi- tionally, ASEAN has failed to adopt a decisive stance on sanctioning member states and their companies that continue business dealings that supply weapons and aviation fuel used by the military in aerial attacks against civilians (Editorial, 2024; Editorial, 2025).
The ascendance of finance capitalism in the United States and its intricate connections to the military-industrial complex further complicates foreign pol- icy options for small and middle power states primarily focused on developing their economies (Maher & Aquanno, 2024). The symbiotic relationship between the military-industrial complex and the tech giants Meta (formerly Facebook), Amazon, Apple, Netflix, and Alphabet (formerly Google)—collectively known as FAANGS—has raised two critical questions regarding human security: (i) the pro- tection of individual data privacy, and (ii) control over public discourse.
The new frontier of the MIC is Artificial Intelligence (AI), funded by the Defense Innovation Unit-Experimental (DIUx), established in 2015 and financed by US taxpayers. According to the United Nations General Assembly Resolution on Enhancing International Cooperation on Capacity-Building of AI, China has proposed that in alignment with the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Develop- ment, “China proposes the AI Capacity-Building Action Plan for Good and for All, and calls on all parties to step up investments in AI capacity-building” (UN Gen- eral Assembly, 2024). US sanctions have introduced new paradigms concerning AI literacy and the digital divide, evolving from the concept of the networked society in the information age first theorized by Manuel Castells (2011) (Gonzales, 2024). Collectively, the FAANGS, empowered by AI technologies, can exercise significant influence over political discourse, information dissemination, and the legitimation of domestic politics. Elon Musk, who heads the temporarily formed Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), has recently demonstrated sup- port for far-right movements globally (Ingram & Horvath, 2025). While the direct impact of these developments may not be immediately apparent in Southeast Asia, their ripple effects are becoming evident, as illustrated by the recent “East Asian Supremacist” arrest in Singapore (Mohamed, 2025). BRICS has already taken steps towards reclaiming the control of AI being dominated by US tech giants through initiatives like the AI Study Group and the Digital Economy Work- ing Group as committed during the 2023 BRICS Summit and the BRICS-led New

Development Bank (NDB) that invests in AI applications with BRICS countries (Goswami, 2024). Similarly, the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA), officially endorsed by the ASEAN Economic Ministers’ (AEM) meeting on August 19, 2023, offers a framework for regional cooperation.
Global South states now face additional challenges with the newly elected “America First” President, Donald Trump. The Department of State has announced cuts to all foreign aid, depriving Global South states of funding for essential ser- vices such as clinics, landmine clearance, and refugee support, despite the fact that foreign assistance constitutes merely 1% of the federal budget while providing 40% of global humanitarian aid, placing the populations of Global South states at greater risk (The Economist, 2025). This vacuum inevitably creates opportunities for Chi- na’s soh power diplomacy.
However, Chinese diplomatic efforts will be tested by ongoing tensions sur- rounding Taiwan’s independence and the One China policy, particularly in the contested South China Sea (SCS). China’s territorial disputes with the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia will continue to influence perceptions of its diplomatic approach, especially given its rejection of the 2016 International Court of Justice ruling that favored the Philippines regarding SCS claims. ASEAN member states must navigate these complex issues through existing mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN-Plus One, and ASEAN-Plus Three frame- works, addressing the intersections of hard diplomacy, soh power, and contempo- rary digital diplomacy challenges.
Conceptual Framework

As “US disengagement” from Europe continues and its strategic pivot to Asia intensifies, as outlined during the recent Munich security conference, the con- cepts of “multipolarity” and ASEAN’s role as a regional body merit scholarly atten- tion. We seek papers from diverse theoretical perspectives, ranging from Kantian idealism—which analyzes the importance of regional cooperation for the common good—to traditionalist Hobbesian realism, which emphasizes statism, survival, and self-help in understanding why states discretely permit the supply of jet fuel and arms to the Myanmar junta (Schmidt, 2022). Additionally, the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), developed by Barry Buzan (2003), offers a framework for analyzing these complexities through multi-level analysis, examining domestic, regional, and global factors while prioritizing regional interactions (Graham, 2024).