Future Geopolitical Prospects for Collective Growth

Part I. Introduction and analysis

In the light of the current geopolitical situation, this study will examine con­temporary realities, their historical and diplomatic context, and future prospects in the face of the collapse of U.S. unilateralism, the emergence of a multipolar world with its risks and benefits, and the changing socio-economic environment.

The study will focus on the strengthening of regional institutions, the rela­tionship between them as ‘communicating vessels’, examples of socio-economic modernisation, and the evolution of markets.

General context

Fr om 1947 up to the present day (2025), the world has witnessed the collapse of numerous colonial empires and the rise of hundreds of post-colonial states, many of which have found themselves in internecine conflicts due to their failure to establish internal socio-economic systems.

The Americas gained their independence fr om Great Britain, France, and Spain within pre-existing institutional frameworks. In Spain’s case, the process was rooted in its established viceroyalties, whose authorities maintained effective administra­tive control over their entire territories. Moreover, Spanish imperial policies largely avoided the chronic ethnic tensions seen in the United States, Canada, and Haiti.

The eastward expansion of the United States involved the extermination of Native Americans and their forced relocation to reservations, as well as the expan­sion of U.S. administrative power through the establishment of new states within the Union. Contrary to common perception, the primary cause of the American Civil War was not solely the problem of slavery. Instead, it was largely driven by the issue that both Americans at the time and many Europeans today grapple with, namely the balance of power between the Union’s federal government and indi­vidual states. This ideological divide defined the opposing sides: the Unionists (winners), characterised by a large middle class, large industrial and economic cap­ital and a thalassocratic mentality, which allowed them to benefit more from trade through the Union; and the Confederates (losers), who also had a large middle class, developed agriculture and animal husbandry (but underdeveloped industry and financial sectors), tellurocratic tradition and strong attachment to their land, which fuelled their local patriotism.

Despite wars of independence and, in the case of the United States, territorial expansion across the continent and into the Caribbean, the Americas have avoided large-scale conflicts comparable to those witnessed in Europe or Africa.

During the decolonisation of Africa, the British and French left behind vast, resource-rich nations with small populations, lacking industrial infrastructure and, more critically, extremely weak administrative governance systems. This legacy continues to hinder many African states today, as they struggle with poor gover­nance, often falling under the control of local militias, whether separatist or revolu­tionary, or even groups tied to international terrorism.

The period from 1945 to 1949 marked the dawn of a new world order. The end of World War II left Europe devastated and stripped of its international dominance, concentrating global power in the hands of the United States and the Soviet Union. The shift became evident in 1956 when France, Britain, and Israel were forced to withdraw from Egypt under pressure from U.S. President Eisenhower and Soviet leader Khrushchev, who supported Gamal Abdel Nasser through UN mechanisms. The crisis had significant political repercussions: British Prime Minister Anthony Eden resigned and French Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle, despite his strong anti-communist stance, lost confidence in NATO, leading to France’s partial with­drawal from the alliance. In addition, the end of the French mandate for Syria and the Lebanon and their eventual independence from France in 1946, as well as the British withdrawal from Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq, left a legacy of chronic instability in the region.

The British withdrawal from the British Raj resulted in its division into three nations: India, Pakistan, and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), leading to rising tensions and numerous conflicts in the region. Meanwhile, Mao Zedong’s victory in China in 1949 marked the conclusion of a transformative period in global poli­tics, signalling the establishment of a new world order. During this time, the Bret- ton Woods system, created in 1944, emerged amidst intensifying rivalry between Soviet Marxism-Leninism and Chinese Maoism, as the world became divided into competing blocs and spheres of influence.

Within this context, a complex bipolar world started to take shape. On one side, capitalist states were fragmented: the United States advocated for free trade capitalism, while Europe was developing a capitalist system with significant state intervention. On the other side, within the communist bloc, deep divisions arose between Soviet Marxism-Leninism and Chinese Maoism. This fragmentation led to the use of various definitions within the ‘three worlds’ concept.

Western theory categorises the world into three spheres: the “First World,” consisting of capitalist Western nations; the “Second World,” made up of socialist countries; and the “Third World,” comprising newly decolonised states. In contrast, Mao’s theory redefines these categories: the United States and the Soviet Union as the “First World”; developed nations like Australia, France, Britain, and Germany, which lack global dominance, as the “Second World”; and developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as the “Third World.”

These differing perspectives highlight that geopolitical nuances are influenced by cultural and anthropological perceptions within societies, extending beyond ideological differences. Culture plays a crucial role in shaping the future world. For instance, in Europe, a cultural rivalry can be anticipated between Germanic and Mediterranean states, reflecting historical, linguistic, and economic tensions between Protestantism/Anglicanism and Catholicism/Orthodoxy. Notably, Cath­olic and Orthodox countries often embrace more socially oriented economic the­ories, contrasting with the liberal economic concepts prevalent in Protestant and Anglican societies.

This results in tensions between major powers, particularly in continental Europe, wh ere Berlin and Paris have been competing for influence since the 19th century. These tensions intensify when Britain becomes involved. In World Order, Henry Kissinger argues that Britain’s role has historically been to monitor power dynamics in Europe. While Britain sought opportunities for trade without political interference, it viewed any dominant continental power as a serious threat. Such dominance within continental Europe could challenge Britain’s naval supremacy, which was the foundation of its global influence. Two key principles emerged fr om this strategy: first, no single power should dominate the continent — a view shaped by Britain's expulsion from France after the Hundred Years’ War; second, Britain should actively oppose such powers. The strategy was employed against the Span­ish Empire during the Eighty Years’ War, against France in conflicts such as the Thirty Years’ War (1627-1629), the Anglo-Dutch War (1666-1667), and the Second Hundred Years’ War (1688-1815), culminating in the Napoleonic Wars, which solid­ified France’s perception of Britain as its natural adversary and a persistent obsta­cle to achieving European dominance.

The unification of Germany in the 19th century intensified tensions across Europe, particularly following German victories over France and Austria-Hungary.

In response, France and Great Britain, concerned about the rise of a German state, allied with Russia. Germany countered by forging alliances with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire. These rivalries ultimately culminated in the outbreak of World Wars I and II.

The dominance of a single country in Europe was historically seen as a threat, but everything changed after World War II. The concept of European continental power was inherited by the United States and the Soviet Union, which then divided Europe into spheres of influence, with the USSR becoming the primary existential threat to the United States and its allies.

For the United States, Europe was both a promising market and a potential threat that needed to be neutralised through indirect influence. The strategy was straightforward: rebuilding Europe under the Marshall Plan, alongside initiatives such as NATO, the Council of Europe, the European Coal and Steel Community (the foundation of the future EU), and the United Nations.

This strategy incorporated several concepts, starting with Mahan’s theory of controlling the seas and straits, which remains relevant today. The theory empha­sises the importance of a powerful navy for deterring adversaries, securing trade routes, and maintaining control over crucial sea passages, such as the Persian Gulf, Suez Canal, Atlantic route, Panama Canal, Mediterranean route, etc. It also high­lights the significance of naval bases and logistical support. To support this dual offensive/defensive strategy, the United States has established naval bases glob­ally. This ensures the effective use of sea power to assert dominance while protect­ing U.S. interests and trade routes. Additionally, the approach includes leveraging political and diplomatic influence built upon the above fundamental elements.

Gentlemen, we live in a world wh ere ideals may be commendable, but the realm of diplomacy and international relations offers only a limited number of ways for a state to assert its dominance. This can only be achieved by either being a cul­tural power capable of mobilising and destabilising an entire region (e.g., Iran), hav­ing a population exceeding 100 million, serving as a critical financial hub for global financial flows, or possessing a formidable military. A strong military capable of confronting similarly powerful states remains essential for earning respect on the global stage. Diplomatic strength depends not only on the skills of diplomats but also on the military capability of the state. Historical figures like Talleyrand, Met­ternich, Viscount Castlereagh, and Tsar Alexander achieved diplomatic success because their nations wielded significant military power, whether it was France’s army, Austria-Hungary’s might, Britain’s navy, or Russia’s formidable armed forces. It is extremely difficult to win without trump cards.

The United States and, to a lesser extent, the USSR played their military trump cards alongside their allies by establishing a network of alliances grounded in institutional frameworks (as we shall see later). This marked a shift away fr om the ‘face-to-face’ diplomacy that was common before 1945, and the experience of the League of Nations proved the validity of this approach.

Alongside Mahan’s theory, which forms the foundation of current U.S. geo­politics and which, curiously enough, is tacitly applied by Turkiye which adapts it, through its Mavi Vatan doctrine, to its maritime realities, the Western view of Rus­sia is influenced by Mackinder’s theory.

Mackinder identified the “World Island,” encompassing Eurasia and Africa, which he described as regions containing the majority of global resources and serving as the arena for competition for geopolitical supremacy, with America posi­tioned on the periphery. Within this “World Island” lies the “Heartland,” extending from the Kola Peninsula to the Urals and southward through the Caucasus, the Black and Caspian Seas, Iran, and the Middle East.

Russia controls over 50% of the Heartland, which means it controls human resources, trade routes and major natural resources. Russia, whether it desires this or not, is destined (like any other power that controls the sea) to be a superpower. Situated at the ‘centre of the world,’ Russia is a pivotal force whose role is indis­pensable in global affairs. Its diplomatic relations with Central Asia and Iran are crucial, while its assertive policies in the Transcaucasus further solidify its regional dominance. Despite Turkiye’s cultural diplomacy efforts rooted in Turanism — an ideology that has greatly benefited Ankara — Russia has successfully maintained these countries within its sphere of influence.

Where is this evident? Firstly, in Russia’s capacity to transport large cargoes between its European borders and the Bering Strait, as well as in its strategic role as a key hub on China’s Silk Road. Additionally, Russia has established its own West­East trade route, which it largely controls, with over 80% of the route between China and Europe passing through sovereign Russian territory. Furthermore, Rus­sia’s strategic focus on southern regions via the North-South corridor strengthens its comprehensive alliance with Iran. The corridor connects Russia’s warm-water ports on the Black Sea to the Indian Ocean through access to Iran’s Chabahar port. At the same time, it enables Russia to tap into southern resources, positioning itself as a dynamic force in global trade.

China and India

China, which faced humiliation during the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century under the declining and ineffective Qing dynasty, underwent a profound transformation following the nationalist uprising led by Sun Yat-sen, continued by Chiang Kai-shek, and culminating in Mao Zedong’s Communist victory. This transition marked the rise of a new geopolitical and economic model for China. The leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in many ways resembles the traditional administrative and imperial system of China, evolving over time to become more Confucian than Marxist. China’s consolidation of con­trol over territories such as Xinjiang (East Turkestan) and Tibet, along with ongoing border disputes with India over regions such as Aksai Chin (currently administered by China but claimed by India) and areas south of the McMahon Line (Arunachal Pradesh, currently administered by India but claimed by China), has contributed to strained relations between Beijing and New Delhi. The Dalai Lama’s presence in Ladakh intensifies tensions. These developments demonstrate China’s resur­gence as an expanding power following the tumultuous decades that led to the fall of its last imperial dynasty and the years of warfare preceding Mao Zedong’s rise to power. Despite ideological divisions within global communism (such as the split between Marxist-Leninists and Maoists), the Sino-Soviet split and differ­ing stances during the armed conflict between Vietnam (supported by the USSR) and Cambodia (backed by China) highlighted China’s ambition to assert itself as a global power. This ambition is rooted in China’s identity as a civilization state rather than adherence to Marxist-Leninist ideology, from which the CPC has dis­tanced itself to carve an independent path in the 20th and 21st centuries.

The Heihe-Tengchong line, which divides China into the eastern region (wh ere 94% of the population resides) and the western region (which is home to only 6%), also highlights the ethnic divide. The eastern region is predominantly inhabited by Han Chinese, who form the cultural backbone of the Chinese state, while the western region is home to Chinese belonging to diverse ethnic groups such as Mongols, Turkic peoples, Tibetans, and many others. Consolidating control over its western territories is a priority for China, as it cannot leave half of its land unutilised. However, China’s strategic focus has shifted toward maritime ambitions, presenting challenges for the United States. Examples include the retrocession of Macau and Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty, alongside tensions in Hong Kong, wh ere, however, Xi Jinping effectively quelled protests by delegating responsibility to Chief Executive Carrie Lam. Broader issues include Taiwan, the dispute over the Senkaku Islands, tensions in the South China Sea, North Korea’s nuclear weapon capabilities, conflicts with Japan and South Korea, and the presence of U.S. military bases in Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines. Additionally, the Five Eyes intelligence alliance, comprising Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom, plays a significant role in this complex geopoliti­cal landscape.

At the same time, China poses an economic threat due to several key factors. During Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, the country underwent a major transition towards a more open economy. The shift enabled greater access to financial assets and provided Chinese citizens with more opportunities for economic growth. The reforms also involved industrialisation and the modernisation of transport infra­structure, including roads, ports, and railways. Notably, China’s railway network grew fr om approximately 60,000 kilometres in 2000 to 80,000 kilometres by 2023, a 33.33% increase.

China’s industrial growth was fuelled by a combination of central planning by the Communist Party and the relocation of factories from Europe and the United States, attracted by China’s lower labour costs, abundant raw materials, developed infrastructure, and favourable conditions. This process accelerated China’s indus­trialisation, resulting in some 2.6 million factories and plants across the country in 2000, which increased to 4.2 million by 2023, a growth of 61.54% over 23 years.

China’s role as the world’s factory has enabled it to extend its influence to other continents through a diplomatic approach centred on trade, infrastructure development, and financial investment. This strategy has offset China’s relatively limited military power compared to the United States and is characterised by lesser emphasis on ideology and reduced interference in the internal affairs of other nations. However, China lacks the cultural dominance possessed by some other world powers. As a result, it relies on its growing economic and naval capabilities to safeguard its maritime ambitions, reminiscent of the legendary voyages of Zheng He, the famed navigator of the Ming Empire. Zheng He’s expeditions reached Afri­ca’s eastern shores, established trade routes across the Indian Ocean, and collected tribute from various regions. Interestingly, these missions were often symbolic rather than economically driven, as China, the “Middle Kingdom”, had abundant resources within its own borders at the time.

Indeed, the level of production during the Ming dynasty, driven by domes­tic demand, a vast network of workshops, and innovations such as papermaking, brought China to the brink of an industrial revolution.

China is actively working to expand its maritime influence in the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca while strengthening its trade routes across the Asia-Pacific, including fostering ties with the United States and Hispanic America. Additionally, China is focusing on Africa’s east coast, leveraging Kenya and Dji­bouti as strategic hubs to access the natural resources of central Africa. Meanwhile, the United States has imposed significant tariffs on Chinese goods to protect its domestic industries. While these measures may help the U.S. meet domestic mar­ket demands and revitalise its industrial base, they are expected to cause short- to medium-term economic challenges for the U.S. itself. This situation mirrors Euro­pean sanctions against Russia, which ultimately harmed Europe more than Russia, as both Russian customers and Russian suppliers of goods and services quickly redirected their trade to emerging markets that share scepticism towards the West. Especially, to countries with anti-Western leanings, such as Venezuela, along with nations like India, China itself, Ethiopia, and Sudan. These countries have become both new buyers of Russian goods and suppliers of products and foodstuffs previ­ously banned from being exported from Europe to Russia. Additionally, Russia has utilised these countries as intermediaries to resell its goods to Europe at higher prices, with the intermediary countries earning commissions in the process. This has contributed to inflation in Europe and created challenges for European indus­tries in accessing new markets. Furthermore, much of Europe’s industrial base, spanning food, industrial, and technological sectors, remains located outside the region, exacerbating these difficulties.

In response to U.S. tariffs, China can employ several strategies to mitigate their impact. These include diverting some of its products to alternative markets, using intermediaries to circumvent tariffs (which could affect domestic consumption in the United States), and expanding into new markets. By doing so, China not only reduces the economic impact of tariffs but also enhances its geopolitical influence.

India’s situation bears similarities to China’s, but it has yet to address its signif­icant social inequalities. While China’s middle class expanded by 900% between 2000 and 2024, India’s middle class grew by only 300% during the same period, remaining relatively small and unstable. In addition, India faces a challenging geo­political environment. It has strained relations with China due to border disputes and serves as a sanctuary for the Dalai Lama, a vocal critic of Beijing. India also con­tends with serious border conflicts with Pakistan and ongoing separatist tensions in Kashmir, which have consumed substantial military and financial resources. Further complicating matters are tensions in the country’s eastern region stem­ming from the conflict between Bangladesh and Myanmar over the Rohingya issue. India also seeks to establish itself geopolitically as both a subcontinent and a state civilization rooted in Hindu identity, akin to China’s civilizational model. However, internally, India faces deep divisions among various sects, with the two primary branches of Hinduism, Vaishnavism in the north and Shaivism in the south, not always coexisting harmoniously. Additionally, India grapples with tensions involv­ing Sikh separatist movements and, obviously, challenges in fostering coexistence with its Muslim population. These dynamics are reflected in the process of ‘saffro- nisation’ based on Hindutva, an identity-driven ideology aimed at unifying India by portraying Muslims and Christians as inheritors of two ‘dark ages’ in Indian histo­riography, the Mughal Empire and the British Raj.

Interestingly, India has historically been a mosaic of empires, kingdoms, and principalities rather than a unified entity, with the idea of a united India largely stemming from British colonial rule. India’s geopolitical orientation towards Cen­tral Asia was shaped significantly by British Raj’s strategic focus, particularly its obsession with the Khyber Pass. The partition of British India into India and Pakistan resulted in the creation of an Islamic republic hostile to India, which has obstructed India’s ambitions in Central Asia. To counter this, India has strength­ened its ties with Iran, leveraging the strategic importance of Chabahar Port, the only Iranian port not under U.S. sanctions, as a key hub for trade with Afghanistan. This strategy allows India to bypass Pakistan and exert pressure on it. In fact, India’s relationship with Afghanistan remains highly favourable, especially for the latter:

2000-2005: Bilateral trade remained low but began to rise in 2003, primarily driven by agricultural products and consumer goods.

2006-2010: Bilateral agreements facilitated a significant expansion of trade, reaching $1-2 billion annually.

2011-2015: Trade grew to $5 billion, supported by Indian aid and growth in commodity sectors.

2016-2019: Trade volume peaked at $1.6 billion in 2019 but remained modest compared to the GDPs of both nations.

2020-2023: Trade was negatively impacted by Afghanistan’s political instabil­ity, declining to $1-1.5 billion in recent years.

Trade with Afghanistan constitutes less than 1% of India’s GDP, but for Afghan­istan, it accounts for approximately 20-30% of its total trade. This relationship has enabled India to access resources, establish trade routes, expand its regional influ­ence, and strengthen its presence in Central Asia. Consequently, trade between India and Central Asian nations, including Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, has steadily grown from 2000 to 2023:

1.   2000-2010: Initially, trade between India and Central Asian countries was limited but began to rise around 2006. During this period, the annual trade fluctu­ated between $500 million and $1.5 billion.

2.   2011-2015: Trade experienced a significant surge, exceeding $5 billion. This growth was primarily driven by sectors such as energy, agriculture, and infrastruc­ture.

3.   2016-2020: The upward trend in trade continued, reaching $6-8 billion in a few years. This increase was fuelled by new ties and agreements.

4.   2021-2023: Despite geopolitical challenges affecting regional trade dynam­ics, trade between India and Central Asia remained relatively stable.

In percentage terms, trade with Central Asia represents a minor portion of India’s GDP, accounting for less than 1%. However, it constitutes a significantly larger share of the GDP of Central Asian countries, playing a crucial role in their economic development.

India is also bolstering its presence along the Arab coasts, utilizing the Port of Salalah in Oman to transport goods across the Middle East via land routes, thereby establishing its own trade corridor. Additionally, India has developed a network of naval and trade bases. Strategically located at the centre of the Indian Ocean, India acts as a pivotal axis dividing the ocean into eastern and western regions. The Indian Ocean’s relatively small size, combined with the proximity of Africa, Mad­agascar, Indonesia, and Australia, provides India with a logistical advantage. This geography enables shorter naval operations and reduces logistical efforts com­pared to those required by China, the United States, Russia, or Europe for similar purposes.

In fact, ports such as the aforementioned Chabahar Port in Iran, Sittwe Port in Myanmar, and facilities in India’s island territories, including Lakshadweep, Port Blair, and Car Nicobar, are managed by India. India is increasingly asserting its presence in global industry and banking services by adopting a development model inspired by China. This strategy integrates economic liberalisation, indus­trialisation, technological advancement, and social modernisation (with moderate success), alongside the promotion of a unifying ideology focused on progress.

In China, the dominant ethnic group, the Han, constituting 91% of the popula­tion, is unified by a shared language and culture. In contrast, India’s largest ethnic group, the Indo-Aryans (72%), is highly fragmented both linguistically and reli­giously. Despite these internal divisions, India’s economic power and enhanced diplomatic capabilities enable it to play a strategic role in global relations involving Russia, China, and the United States. As a key member of BRICS, as clearly demon­strated at the recent BRICS summit in Kazan, and through initiatives such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) military exercises with China and Rus­sia and the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (2001), India has solidified its position as an influential geopolitical actor.

Clearly, India’s cultural and public diplomacy efforts in the West have signifi­cantly deepened its global partnerships. For instance, under the Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership with the United States, India signed key agreements such as the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016, the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2018, and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) in 2020. All these efforts enable India to operate effectively within both Western and Russian-Chi­nese systems, positioning it as a bridge between the two. While navigating these complex geopolitical dynamics presents risks, it also offers opportunities for India as an emerging global power. Despite internal divisions that potential adversaries could exploit, India’s strategy of establishing trade routes strengthens its defence against Pakistan while maintaining its role as a reliable ally for all during a period marked by the ongoing shift of global economic centres.

Part II. International institutionalism between Western stagnation and emerging multipolar alternatives (BRICS, Mercosur)

The bipolar division of the world has disappeared as Soviet-era organisations have either dissolved or been restructured to align with Russian interests. These redefined organisations now focus on regional objectives, prioritising the preser­vation of Russian influence in the post-Soviet space, a region marked by growing instability.

Meanwhile, in the West, the neoconservative and unilateralist model gained traction through the expansion of regional institutions. Examples include the transformation of the European Economic Community (EEC) into the European Union (EU) via the Maastricht Treaty, NATO enlargement, OSCE reforms, and the creation of new frameworks such as Mercosur in 2001. Similarly, the Organisa­tion of African Unity (OAU) was restructured into the African Union (AU) in 2001, which later faced tensions with Western nations while strengthening ties with China, Russia, and India. Although these regional organisations were rooted in local initiatives, they enabled the West to foster relationships, promote free trade, and advance institutional democracy under the oversight of dominant global insti­tutions such as the IMF, the UN, and the World Bank.

After the collapse of the USSR and the disappearance of a counterbalance to Western dominance, the United States capitalised on its position to take over the leadership of global organisations and consolidate its power. This was accompanied by the establishment of unified combatant commands, including the SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM, USEUCOM, and USINDOPACOM. Initially rooted in strategies from World War II and the Cold War, these commands were later adapted to address contemporary challenges such as terrorism and populist movements. Supported by its vast commercial, industrial, financial, and military capabilities, U.S. inter­ventionism has enabled the country to define strategic goals, coordinate logistics, and project force globally. Examples include direct U.S. operations in Somalia and Yugoslavia, airstrikes in Sudan and Afghanistan authorised by Bill Clinton, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and proxy interventions across the Middle East. These efforts primarily aimed to reinforce U.S. global dominance, counter opposing blocs, and expand political influence through the promotion of democracy and economic influence via free trade, particularly in regions with socialist systems.

The report Rebuilding America's Defenses, issued in September 2000 by the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), outlined a strategy for American intervention in the Middle East, targeting nations such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Sudan, and Iran. The plan aimed to end the Sykes-Picot agreement and introduce an American model in the region for controlling hydro­carbon resources critical to the global oil economy. However, the costly and unpop­ular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which became a disaster for the United States, exposed significant flaws in U.S. strategy, particularly due to a lack of understanding of the local “human terrain system”. These failures prompted a shift in approach: rather than relying on direct intervention, the U.S. began employing proxies to destabilise adversarial states through diplomatic pressure and sanctions, often in collaboration with its allies. Moreover, Washington shifted away from promoting institutional democracy, instead supporting any political system that could provide minimum stability and access to markets, rejecting socialist statism. This strategy focused on securing resources, consolidating power and influence, and prevent­ing rivals from gaining access to strategic assets. Recent examples illustrate this approach: in January, Syria’s new president adopted a free trade policy to maintain U.S. influence, while Ukrainian President Zelensky is facing demands to repay U.S. aid allocated under former U.S. President Biden and grant access to Ukraine’s rare earth metals.

However, the severe economic crisis of 2009, coupled with the mismanage­ment of the U.S. economy between 2000 and 2016 under the Bush and Obama administrations, and the uneven recovery of EU member states amidst the begin­ning of its institutional decline, created an opportunity for emerging powers like Russia and China. These nations capitalised on this situation to establish their own international frameworks, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), BRICS, and the BRICS Development Bank, laying the groundwork for a multipolar world order. Their strategy had two primary goals: first, to secure stra­tegic positions and, thus, enhance their influence within global organisations such as the United Nations and its specialised agencies. Second, they sought to forge connections with regional institutions such as Mercosur and the European Union, with China focusing on economic and infrastructure projects and Russia on secu­rity cooperation. In Latin America, alongside Mercosur, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America - Peoples' Trade Treaty (ALBA-TCP) emerged as a parallel organisation with a leftist and confrontational stance.

In the current multipolar system, the diplomatic structures established after World War II, which transitioned into a unipolar framework in the 1990s, have failed to adapt to the complexities of the modern international landscape. Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva emphasised this issue during his speech at the UN General Assembly, noting that current global organisations no longer reflect contemporary political, economic, and demographic realities. This disconnect has led to competition for influence and leadership within these institutions, result­ing in two key challenges: first, hostility among second-tier powers who view each other’s rise as a potential future threat; and second, resistance to integrating new members into the global elite. Historical parallels can be drawn with the ascen­sion of Prussia in the 18th century and the emergence of the Russian and German empires in the 19th century, which were not accepted as equals by dominant pow­ers, sparking significant tensions, particularly in Germany’s case.

Diplomacy has transitioned from traditional practices, such as cabinet nego­tiations and face-to-face meetings between leaders or representatives of major empires, often supported by colonial military forces, to a sophisticated network of mediating organisations and mechanisms designed to de-escalate conflicts. In the modern era, tensions within institutions such as the United Nations have become evident, with the United States withdrawing from organisations such as the WHO and the UN Human Rights Council, citing the growing influence of rival states or concerns over sovereignty. Meanwhile, countries like Russia and China have established alternative platforms, most notably BRICS. Representing 46% of the global population (including Argentina) and 37% of global GDP, BRICS also includes rapidly growing economies like Ethiopia, which has achieved an average annual growth rate of 9% despite facing challenges such as conflicts, political cri­ses, and the COVID-19 pandemic.

To delve deeper into this topic, it’s worth examining Austrian philosopher and economist Ludwig von Mises’ perspective on foreign investment as a cru­cial driver of economic growth. Both Russia and China prefer a controlled market opening, prioritising economic sovereignty through state oversight under the con­cept of 'full sovereignty'. This approach involves regulating foreign investment to align with legal standards and strategic national interests, rather than completely closing markets to foreign investors. The Russian model, in particular, warrants closer examination. While not contradicting von Mises’ principles, Russia has uti­lised bilateral agreements and its international institutional framework, supported by geopolitical allies, to insulate its economy from the Western system. Western sanctions imposed over Ukraine have compelled Russia to strengthen its ties with new and more lucrative markets. This has created a paradoxical situation wh ere the sanctioned country, Russia, has benefited by engaging with emerging markets that align with its diplomatic approach rooted in Soviet-era principles of friend­ship of peoples and non-interference in internal affairs. Unlike the West, which often pairs aid and trade with ideological demands that may conflict with the inter­ests of its partners, Russia offers partnerships free fr om socio-political conditions. This approach has enabled countries to choose alliances that better reflect their own interests and values. Meanwhile, the European market has faced challenges, including the loss of direct access to the Russian market and rising costs for Rus­sian goods purchased through intermediaries.

This trade system, grounded in the principle of non-interference, creates a regulated yet open and healthy environment that facilitates capital flows and trade, driving development and modernisation. China’s post-1978 reforms, character­ised by fiscal incentives, economic diversification, and foreign investment, have reshaped the global economic landscape. These reforms enabled the establish­ment of parallel institutions operating outside traditional Western-dominated sys­tems, altering the balance of global economic dynamics.

One advantage of these institutions is that they encompass a significant por­tion of the international community, enabling the dynamic pursuit of shared objec­tives and mutually beneficial solutions. Unlike ideologically rigid organisations, these institutions encourage cooperation, even when geographically oriented, such as the EU, ASEAN, or Mercosur, which permit dual membership. For instance, Tur- kiye is simultaneously a member of NATO and BRICS, still aspires to join the Euro­pean Union, and controls organisations like Turk Kene^i and TURKSOY Similarly, the United Arab Emirates is a member of BRICS, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Arab League while being a close ally of the United States. These organi­sations prioritise practical objectives, such as legal, humanitarian (e.g., promoting human rights), economic, or security-related goals, over ideological divisions rem­iniscent of the Cold War’s bipolar bloc system. However, despite their theoretical potential to surpass the unipolar model that emerged after the Soviet era, they are often seen as highly biased entities. Instead of functioning as purely supranational bodies, they are perceived as being heavily influenced by dominant powers, such as the United States in the UN, Russia in BRICS, and China in the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation.

The multipolar system enables other non-global powers outside the spheres of influence of Russia, China, or the United States to form diverse alliances that offer strategic advantages. Many of these alliances are specifically designed to sup­port the regional geopolitical ambitions of their member states. Empires remain fundamental to civilisations, and the imperial approach continues to shape the strategies of certain nations that are direct heirs of historical imperial systems. This often results in tensions with neighbouring countries, as seen in the Middle East among Iran, Turkiye, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Similar dynamics are evident in Latin America, wh ere socialist states (such as Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua) clash with capitalist systems (such as Colombia, Mexico, and Chile), all operating amidst U.S. dominance in the region. Other global conflicts persist, including dis­putes between Morocco and Algeria, Ethiopia and Egypt/Somalia, Bangladesh and Myanmar, and South Korea and North Korea. These tensions form the focus of the third and final part of this essay, on the concept of Rimland.Part III. The Rimland, a conflict zone

The Monroe Doctrine outlines America’s role through three core principles: preventing foreign powers fr om interfering in the affairs of the Western Hemi­sphere, securing U.S. influence to advance its interests in the region, and ensur­ing continental stability as a cornerstone of U.S. strategy. The doctrine places the hemisphere under U.S. influence, facilitating the application of the Mahan Doc­trine, which emphasises naval power and maritime dominance.

According to Mahan’s theory, the United States derives its strength from sev­eral critical elements: a merchant marine, a navy, control of the seas for the move­ment of troops and goods, the establishment of ports, and expanded control over coastal territories to enhance global influence. Naval bases are not merely ports or transit hubs but strategically positioned coastal territories or states that enable the U.S. to project power deep into continents, particularly in regions like Europe and the Middle East.

According to Mackinder’s theory, the central region of Eurasia, known as the Heartland, is considered the “pivot area” of global power, with control over this area ensuring dominance across the entire Eurasian continent. The Heartland, defined as a telluric (land-based) power, corresponds to Russia. Interestingly, Mackinder argued that these vast territories would be more stable if governed by multiple states rather than a single dominant power. Historically, American strategy has sought to influence or challenge the Heartland, which possesses the land-based strength enabling Russia to project influence throughout Eurasia. Land power offers distinct advantages at this stage, but it is countered by the United States, which, according to the Monroe Doctrine, dominates the sea and controls coastal states and ports. Consequently, the strategic interests of these two powers clash in the Rimland.

The concept of Rimland is straightforward: it encompasses all states situated between the coastal regions and the Heartland, forming the geopolitical “battle­field.” This area includes Europe and the Middle East. The regions bordering Rus­sia and China possess distinct characteristics, which fall outside the scope of this essay for analysis.

The wars in the Middle East between Western-backed monarchies and Rus­sian-supported Arab socialist republics exemplify the struggle for control over the Rimland. Dominance in this strategic area offers critical advantages, particularly for the United States, whose ultimate objective appears to be the fragmentation of Russia into smaller ethnic states, a so-called Balkanisation concept openly dis­cussed since the Cold War. These ongoing conflicts in the Middle East see both major powers engaging indirectly through proxy forces: the United States relies on Israel, while Russia backs Iran. The numerous states involved in the fighting, such as Iraq, Syria and Yemen, along with mediator states like Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, etc., also play an important role in the confrontation. In contrast, Europe presents a different set of geopolitical dynamics.

The eastward expansion of NATO and the EU, along with tensions over Rus­sia’s efforts to extend its influence into the Transcaucasus, the NATOisation of Bal­tic states, and the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, highlight Eastern Europe as a zone of confrontation. These conflicts stem from competing attempts to assert control over regions critical to Russia’s security. Strategic areas such as Kaliningrad, the Suwalki Gap, Belarus, Transnistria, and now the conflict in Ukraine emphasise Rimland’s importance as a battleground for dominance. However, the U.S. and EU have con­sistently sought to undermine Russia’s efforts to engage with Europe on equal terms. Historically, Europe has aimed to integrate Russia only under conditions favourable to itself, often incompatible with Russia’s political and social structures. This drive to influence Moscow has fuelled growing tensions, disinformation cam­paigns, and a deepening divide between the region’s major powers.

The idea of Europe as the world’s centre, with concentric circles of influence radiating outward, is outdated, as is the division between Western and Eastern Europe. Europe’s retreat from the geopolitical elite has marked the end of the Eurocentric world order, reducing it to a regional supranational entity that no lon­ger holds decisive global influence. Europe now finds itself caught between dimin­ishing historical significance and an oppressive present, serving primarily as an arena for power struggles between major players like the United States and Russia. These powers compete for dominance, realising that their stability and leadership in the coming decades, or even throughout the 21st century, depend on maintain­ing or expanding their influence on the continent. Meanwhile, Europe faces chal­lenges from rising economic and technological powers such as China, the U.S., and Japan, alongside internal issues like the decline of the Western ideological system, unprecedented migration waves, and economic pressures driven by increasingly hostile U.S. policies towards European interests.

On the other hand, Russia retains control over Kaliningrad, a strategically vital exclave, maintains Belarus within its sphere of influence, and has secured dom­inance over the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov through territories captured from Ukraine. The incorporation of Crimea has provided Russia with access to strategic maritime routes connecting the Black Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean, linking Sevastopol to Tartus. This advantage is further bolstered by control over significant portions of Ukrainian territory and serves as a deterrent against potential moves by Moldova’s pro-European leadership under Maia Sandu to seize Transnistria. Overall, Russia has achieved substantial geopolitical gains against the West, sta­bilising its position in the Caucasus and asserting control over South Ossetia and

Abkhazia, thereby exerting influence over Georgia regardless of its government’s stance, whether hostile or friendly. Although losing influence in Armenia has been a setback, this has been offset by rapidly strengthening ties with Iran.

At the same time, Russia has faced the challenge of maintaining its pres­ence in Syria but managed to redirect troops and resources to Ukraine, leaving the West, Turkiye, and Israel to handle instability in this strategically important region. Despite this shift, Russia’s primary objective remains securing agreements for the continued use of its military bases in Khmeimim and Tartus, which can be more effectively defended both militarily and diplomatically in the event of chaos within Syria. Additionally, Russia benefits from support provided by its diaspora in Israel and the strategic role of Cyprus, both of which help sustain its influence in the region.

These developments provide grounds to view the situation positively. Despite the ongoing war in Ukraine, Russia has managed to gain control over approximately 20% of Ukrainian territory and to bring about shifts in the international communi­ty’s perception of the conflict, including changes in U.S. policy. The United States now seeks to end the conflict under terms unfavourable to President Zelensky, a departure from the Biden administration’s earlier stance. Accordingly, while Rus­sia’s position in the Rimland is not comparable to the Soviet Union’s dominance over a substantial part of Eastern Europe from 1945 to 1991, it has improved signifi­cantly. Vladimir Putin has adopted a strategy blending diplomatic practices from the 1990s with military intervention capabilities. Although anti-Russian sentiment is strong among Western European elites, this hostility has not escalated into direct military confrontation but remains confined to rhetoric and unrealistic promises of aid to Ukraine, which continues to await EU and NATO membership that remains unfulfilled.

Russia's diplomatic ties with Turkiye, Serbia, Greece, Hungary, Cyprus, and Slovakia, particularly during the ongoing war in Ukraine, demonstrate Russia’s successful defence of its historical and cultural influence in Slavic Europe. This approach has effectively disrupted the unity of groups such as the Visegrad Four, which is now unofficially referred to as the '2+2' group due to internal divisions: Poland and the Czech Republic maintain strong anti-Russian stances, while Hun­gary and Slovakia have adopted pro-Russian positions.

In short, Russia’s role will be shaped not in the Middle East, despite its direct diplomatic ties with Turkiye and Iran and indirect ties with Saudi Arabia (a BRICS candidate) and the United Arab Emirates (a BRICS member), but rather in the European Rimland, wh ere current conditions favour Russia. The gradual U.S. withdrawal from the Biden-initiated conflict in Ukraine, along with the refusal to support Ukraine’s EU and NATO membership, represents a significant victory for Russia. Meanwhile, European states play a largely symbolic and insignificant role. Russia’s advances in Ukraine, reports from Kyiv about potential ceasefire agree­ments on Russian terms, possibly amounting to capitulation, indicate progress toward Moscow’s objectives: establishing control over the liberated territories, ensuring Ukraine’s neutrality, and maintaining Russia’s influence in Transnistria.

Once these goals are achieved, Russia will be positioned to dictate the pace of negotiations with a fragmented, impoverished, deindustrialised and weakened EU to restore diplomatic relations and normalise trade ties, which have continued to benefit Russia while disadvantaging Europe.Conclusions

The author of this essay concludes that the Eurocentric world order, estab­lished in the 18th century, is definitively dead. While remnants of this order per­sisted as a legacy of the Cold War, the current global landscape, shaped by China and India comprising nearly half of the world’s population, the United States cap­italising on its interventions since the 1990s, and Russia blending elements of its Soviet and imperial heritage in its foreign policy, offers a glimpse into the future.

The global landscape is undergoing transformation as numerous countries transition out of poverty and embark on paths of social and economic progress. This shift necessitates a re-evaluation of diplomatic approaches and the structure of international organisations. In an era defined by agility, evolving trade routes, and financial systems enhanced by artificial intelligence, a growing disconnect is evident between real-world dynamics and the geopolitical strategies formulated by academic circles and think tanks. As Samuel Huntington observed, future con­flicts will centre not on ideology or economics but on civilisational identity. Con­sequently, excluding states like Russia from the international community can only lead to problems.

In fact, the tense relations between Washington and the USSR created signif­icant challenges for Europe. The United States, determined to prevent the rise of strong states in the region, pursued a strategy aimed at weakening Europe through various measures. These tensions fostered a bipolar mindset in the Western world, reducing Europe to a dependent region lacking both sovereignty and power. This approach, initially applied to Europe, was later directed at Russia during the 1990s under Clinton and Yeltsin but was reversed under President Putin. Today, Russia has established its identity and priorities, similar to nations such as China, India, Brazil, and Ethiopia. Meanwhile, the United States, tormented by its demons, remains caught between isolationism and interventionism, with Trump’s presi­dency marking a turning point in this era. Post-Trump, the US will no longer be the same. As Russian diplomats have observed, “America is not a serious coun­try; every four years there is a change of administration, and everything changes.” This lack of continuity undermines Washington’s reliability as a partner and erodes trust. As for Europe, it struggles with the absence of a coherent strategy or geopolit­ical vision, and even individual member states fail to demonstrate effective leader­ship (France’s foreign policy under Macron has been disastrous, and Germany, like Britain, lacks a clear geopolitical strategy).

The intricate dynamics of international relations require strategic compo­sure and diplomatic engagement, prioritising de-escalation while advancing trade, economic, financial, and scientific interests. In a volatile multipolar world marked by shifting alliances, influence must be cultivated through measured actions. As Thucydides noted, Sparta’s victory over Athens was achieved not primarily through military might but through their skill in forging alliances and undermining those of Athens.

Today, Russia must prepare for geopolitical confrontation with Europe while simultaneously addressing Europe’s needs amidst global geopolitical instability.