Connecting Eurasia connecting the World: Eurasian connectivity in the 21st Century
Introduction
In the 34 years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the global geoeco- nomic order has seen considerable shifts. The post-1990 economic order came with significant promise. There was an increasing economic convergence and integration observed during the period of rapid globalisation in the 1990s to the end of the global financial crisis in 2008. However, the second decade of the 21st Century was the trailer to the times of economic upheaval ahead, with tariff wars, sanctions, increasing protectionism, and supply chain disruptions dominating the global economic discourse. However, it was during the same decade that increasing emphasis was laid on expediting the completion and operationalisation of existing corridors and the creation of new economic corridors. What is interesting to observe is that connectivity projects fr om the Global South outnumbered the projects from the Global North. This was mainly because of three reasons. First, the growing demand and economic growth in the global south and the developing world, the number of middle and regional powers increasing within the system, and the fragmenting of the rules-based order paved the way for a multipolar world, resulting in an uptick of regional, multilateral and plurilateral connectivity projects and trade corridors, such as the international north-south transit corridor, Northern sea route Eastern maritime corridor, Belt and Road Initiative, middle corridor. These corridors are the umbilical cord of the multipolar world order and arguably focus on a conducive re-globalisation of the worldi.
The Eurasian region, similarly, has witnessed these trends since the 1990s; the Asian economies saw a rapid take-off in the 1990s, the ASEAN countries, the Gulf countries, India, and China at a rapid rate at the end of the 1990s, with the commodities boom, the Russian economy grew rapidly, as the years passed similar phenomena could be observed in Central Asia, Caucasus, and other South Asia, this resulted in a major shift in international politics, wh ere the economic centre of gravity was shifting eastward, as supply chains were reorienting towards Asia. This resulted in the multipolarisation of the World order. This essay looks at the evolution of 21st-century Eurasian connectivity and the geopolitical and geoeconomic shifts that have resulted in the ideation of the creation of new corridors emanating in the global south, particularly Asia; the essay argues that connectivity emerged as a panacea for regional actors whose latent power increased in recent years, due to this the nature of bilateral relations among countries in Eurasia changed, with the political-economic convergences taking place, the economic pillars in cooperation bolstered.
Eurasian connectivity
There are multiple interpretations of the term “Eurasia”, as the interpretation varies according to the discipline. However, this essay will veer away from the traditional understanding of Eurasia coined by Nikolai Danilevsky, understand Eurasia from a 21st-century perspective, and understand the region through the lens of connectivity, Russia’s Greater Eurasian Partnership, which emphasises the harmonisation of Eurasian connectivity by the linking of projects such as the Eurasian Economic Union, BRI, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and INSTC, which would aim to strengthen connectivity in Eurasia would be ideal in understanding.
As connectivity in the case of Eurasia has been developed in light of the dissonance with the Western-led economic order, which had barriers to entry and was not in the interest of the needs of the developing world, thus in the late 1990s, the Russia-India-China troika was established. Coined by Foreign Minister Evgeny Primakov, the trilateral mechanism aimed to counterbalance the influence of the West; however, the first major connectivity project was the INSTC, which was a 7,200 km long multi-modal transit corridor connecting the Indian port of Mumbai to St Petersburg, via Iran and Azerbaijan, the project was envisioned in 2000. The corridor aimed to mitigate the volatility in the Middle East by bypassing the strait of Hormuz and Suez Canal and aimed to increase trade between India and Russia. The corridor aims to reduce transit time by 40% and costs by 30%ii. INSTC is
India’s gateway to Eurasian trade and pivotal to India’s connect Central Asia strat- egyiii. The success of the INSTC also has regional security undertones; increasing trade along the INSTC can result in increased business participation, and strong governance mechanisms can create employment opportunities, increase trade, and significantly reduce radicalism.
Along with the INSTC, the Eastern Maritime Corridor connects the port of Vladivostok with the Eastern Indian ports of Chennai, Pardwip, and Vishakapat- nam. India’s interest in re-operationalising the Soviet trading route has resulted in New Delhi’s interest in engaging with the Russian Far East increasing. India has pledged credit worth $1 billion for investing in the Russian Far Eastiv, and this increasing interest has resulted in Indian firms setting up industries in the Far East. Further, major Indian firm ONGC continues to operate in the Sakhalin project. Thus, connectivity projects act as a catalyst for increasing investments. By the end of 2024, the Eastern Maritime Corridor became operational.
West’s disinterest in engaging with Russia since 2014, in the form of increasing tranches of sanctions and restrictions, resulted in trade and the increasing tariff war, saw Eurasian trade grow and emerge, and the impetus for improving connectivity in Eurasia was observed. It was during this period that the Chinese Belt and Road initiative began and was later linked with the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015. BRI is a comprehensive transit corridor, with six major corridors and segments connecting China to Europe, encompassing 60 countries. The development of the corridor has resulted in the economies of Central Asia, Inner Asia and Russia having direct benefits; the cooperation has resulted in railway logistics from China to Europe via Russia through the Eurasian land bridge becoming more seamless. It is because of this investment in connectivity that bilateral trade between partners significantly improved; Russia’s bilateral trade with China has skyrocketed since 2014, from $88 billion to $240 billion in 2024. Further avenues for cooperation emerged through the Primorsky International Transit Corridor connecting the hinterland ports in Northeastern China and the Russian Far East. Further cooperation in agriculture has increased through the New Land Grain Corridor. BRI has resulted in increasing economic integration in Eurasian countries.
Graph 1: Russia-China and Russia-EU trade since 2014
Source: Author’s compilation of data from Rosstat, UN Comtrade, and Chinese customs datav.
Emerging trends in Eurasian transit trade and logistics
Connectivity in the CIS states has improved significantly, new economic realities have resulted in Central Asian countries reaching new heights, and the complex interdependence has resulted in states resolving issues bilaterally. Recently, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan concluded their border agreement to resolve border problems, interstate river water disputes over the jurisdiction and daming of the Amu and Syr Darya rivers have had better mechanisms in comparison to the past, this was majorly due to the economic questions gaining more relevance. Key projects such as the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway line, the trans-Iran corridor from Uzbekistan to Iran, the trans-Kazakhistan railway, and the Khorgos logistics hub aim to boost regional connectivity and trade. Further, Kazakh President Kassym Jomart Tokayev has expressed interest in strengthening its position as a key transit hub in Eurasian logisticsvi.
Because of these changes, the nature of relationships has begun to change, and actors in Eurasia have become pragmatic. For instance, the India-Russia relations. According to Dimitri Trenin, the bedrock of this bilateral partnership was the military-technical partnership. However, in the second decade of the 21st Century, the economic cooperation between the two nations improved considerably. At the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, a new energy pillar was emboldened in the Indo-Russia relations. Because of sanctions, India became the conduit for Russian crude to the rest of the worldvii. India’s bilateral trade with Russia surged from $12 billion in 2021 to $65 billion in 2024. Even with the increase in sanctions, both countries have created bilateral mechanisms to continue trade. Russian insurance giants such as Ingosstrakh and AlfaStrakhovanie provided insurance to Indian crude imports from Russia. It was interesting to note that a rapid de-dollarisation occurred in New Delhi’s trade with Russia. Both countries settled payments in rupees, dirhams, yuan, and other non-western currencies. Thus, significant growth has been observed in Eurasian trade due to the increasing investment in logistics, alternative banking mechanisms, and plans for the digitalisation of currencies. What is further interesting is that in recent years, BRICS has played an important role in setting the discourse for the creation of an alternative world orderviii; however, drawing blueprints to realise visions will require significant effort from all stakeholders. However, several challenges remain.
Challenges
Three challenges act as an impediment to Eurasian connectivity. First is the geopolitical risks that hamper connectivity projects. India’s bilateral concerns with China and a lack of agreement on the borders led to strained relations, which is why New Delhi remained among the few countries in Asia that did not join the BRI, another reason for which was the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a part of BRI traversed through contested territory claimed by India, New Delhi’s concerns with Beijing and Islamabad resulted in a lack of long-term economic cooperation. Further, the South Asian region has the poorest connectivity in the world. Despite increasing tourism, business interests remain low. Further concerns emerge regarding the strategic stability of Eurasia, the Nagarno Karabakh conflict, and the post-conflict restoration of Afghanistan, which are some of the difficulties. Further, in the case of INSTC, despite the impetus, it took more than 23 years to begin trial runs because of US sanctions on Iran. Further, even on the EMC, the scale of operations is low, and firms continue to use the Mumbai -St Petersburg sea route.
Second is the restraints in the creation of an alternative geoeconomic order, caused externally because of the threat of Western sanctions and even with increasing demands for the use of national currencies across Eurasia and to create alternative payment systems, the threat of secondary sanctions acts as an impediment. Creating a new payment system is not easy and will have to evolve, with states needing to agree on standards and codes, which will not be easy in the short term. Third, logistical concerns persist in throwing a spanner in the works; for instance, in the case of the NSR, even though there is a strong political will for cooperation, the number of capable icebreakers is insufficient. Other concerns, such as the influx and shortages of shipping containers, can cause issues in multimodal transit corridors. Thus, addressing these concerns requires strong political will and capacity among partners, which is, at times, absent.
Way forward
In recent years, connectivity in Eurasia has sparked considerable interest in global geoeconomics. With centres of power shifting to Asia, a political-economic shift has been taking place in Eurasia as countries increasingly invest in fostering trade, investment, and cooperation as the pivot to Asia takes place. Initiatives like INSTC, BRI, and corridors such as the NSR and the Eastern Maritime corridor under the flag of the Greater Eurasian Partnership have strengthened integration while challenging the Western-led order. Despite progress, challenges remain, including geopolitical tensions, border disputes, and sanctions. Thus, building an alternative geoeconomic framework requires financial and political coordination.
Nevertheless, the continued push for connectivity highlights its strategic importance. With cooperation and pragmatic diplomacy, Eurasia can shape a more resilient and interconnected future in an increasingly multipolar world.
Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Research Assistant at Observer Research Assistant at the Observer Research Foundation and a PhD Candidate at the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University
Introduction
In the 34 years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the global geoeco- nomic order has seen considerable shifts. The post-1990 economic order came with significant promise. There was an increasing economic convergence and integration observed during the period of rapid globalisation in the 1990s to the end of the global financial crisis in 2008. However, the second decade of the 21st Century was the trailer to the times of economic upheaval ahead, with tariff wars, sanctions, increasing protectionism, and supply chain disruptions dominating the global economic discourse. However, it was during the same decade that increasing emphasis was laid on expediting the completion and operationalisation of existing corridors and the creation of new economic corridors. What is interesting to observe is that connectivity projects fr om the Global South outnumbered the projects from the Global North. This was mainly because of three reasons. First, the growing demand and economic growth in the global south and the developing world, the number of middle and regional powers increasing within the system, and the fragmenting of the rules-based order paved the way for a multipolar world, resulting in an uptick of regional, multilateral and plurilateral connectivity projects and trade corridors, such as the international north-south transit corridor, Northern sea route Eastern maritime corridor, Belt and Road Initiative, middle corridor. These corridors are the umbilical cord of the multipolar world order and arguably focus on a conducive re-globalisation of the worldi.
The Eurasian region, similarly, has witnessed these trends since the 1990s; the Asian economies saw a rapid take-off in the 1990s, the ASEAN countries, the Gulf countries, India, and China at a rapid rate at the end of the 1990s, with the commodities boom, the Russian economy grew rapidly, as the years passed similar phenomena could be observed in Central Asia, Caucasus, and other South Asia, this resulted in a major shift in international politics, wh ere the economic centre of gravity was shifting eastward, as supply chains were reorienting towards Asia. This resulted in the multipolarisation of the World order. This essay looks at the evolution of 21st-century Eurasian connectivity and the geopolitical and geoeconomic shifts that have resulted in the ideation of the creation of new corridors emanating in the global south, particularly Asia; the essay argues that connectivity emerged as a panacea for regional actors whose latent power increased in recent years, due to this the nature of bilateral relations among countries in Eurasia changed, with the political-economic convergences taking place, the economic pillars in cooperation bolstered.
Eurasian connectivity
There are multiple interpretations of the term “Eurasia”, as the interpretation varies according to the discipline. However, this essay will veer away from the traditional understanding of Eurasia coined by Nikolai Danilevsky, understand Eurasia from a 21st-century perspective, and understand the region through the lens of connectivity, Russia’s Greater Eurasian Partnership, which emphasises the harmonisation of Eurasian connectivity by the linking of projects such as the Eurasian Economic Union, BRI, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and INSTC, which would aim to strengthen connectivity in Eurasia would be ideal in understanding.
As connectivity in the case of Eurasia has been developed in light of the dissonance with the Western-led economic order, which had barriers to entry and was not in the interest of the needs of the developing world, thus in the late 1990s, the Russia-India-China troika was established. Coined by Foreign Minister Evgeny Primakov, the trilateral mechanism aimed to counterbalance the influence of the West; however, the first major connectivity project was the INSTC, which was a 7,200 km long multi-modal transit corridor connecting the Indian port of Mumbai to St Petersburg, via Iran and Azerbaijan, the project was envisioned in 2000. The corridor aimed to mitigate the volatility in the Middle East by bypassing the strait of Hormuz and Suez Canal and aimed to increase trade between India and Russia. The corridor aims to reduce transit time by 40% and costs by 30%ii. INSTC is
India’s gateway to Eurasian trade and pivotal to India’s connect Central Asia strat- egyiii. The success of the INSTC also has regional security undertones; increasing trade along the INSTC can result in increased business participation, and strong governance mechanisms can create employment opportunities, increase trade, and significantly reduce radicalism.
Along with the INSTC, the Eastern Maritime Corridor connects the port of Vladivostok with the Eastern Indian ports of Chennai, Pardwip, and Vishakapat- nam. India’s interest in re-operationalising the Soviet trading route has resulted in New Delhi’s interest in engaging with the Russian Far East increasing. India has pledged credit worth $1 billion for investing in the Russian Far Eastiv, and this increasing interest has resulted in Indian firms setting up industries in the Far East. Further, major Indian firm ONGC continues to operate in the Sakhalin project. Thus, connectivity projects act as a catalyst for increasing investments. By the end of 2024, the Eastern Maritime Corridor became operational.
West’s disinterest in engaging with Russia since 2014, in the form of increasing tranches of sanctions and restrictions, resulted in trade and the increasing tariff war, saw Eurasian trade grow and emerge, and the impetus for improving connectivity in Eurasia was observed. It was during this period that the Chinese Belt and Road initiative began and was later linked with the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015. BRI is a comprehensive transit corridor, with six major corridors and segments connecting China to Europe, encompassing 60 countries. The development of the corridor has resulted in the economies of Central Asia, Inner Asia and Russia having direct benefits; the cooperation has resulted in railway logistics from China to Europe via Russia through the Eurasian land bridge becoming more seamless. It is because of this investment in connectivity that bilateral trade between partners significantly improved; Russia’s bilateral trade with China has skyrocketed since 2014, from $88 billion to $240 billion in 2024. Further avenues for cooperation emerged through the Primorsky International Transit Corridor connecting the hinterland ports in Northeastern China and the Russian Far East. Further cooperation in agriculture has increased through the New Land Grain Corridor. BRI has resulted in increasing economic integration in Eurasian countries.
Graph 1: Russia-China and Russia-EU trade since 2014
Source: Author’s compilation of data from Rosstat, UN Comtrade, and Chinese customs datav.
Emerging trends in Eurasian transit trade and logistics
Connectivity in the CIS states has improved significantly, new economic realities have resulted in Central Asian countries reaching new heights, and the complex interdependence has resulted in states resolving issues bilaterally. Recently, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan concluded their border agreement to resolve border problems, interstate river water disputes over the jurisdiction and daming of the Amu and Syr Darya rivers have had better mechanisms in comparison to the past, this was majorly due to the economic questions gaining more relevance. Key projects such as the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway line, the trans-Iran corridor from Uzbekistan to Iran, the trans-Kazakhistan railway, and the Khorgos logistics hub aim to boost regional connectivity and trade. Further, Kazakh President Kassym Jomart Tokayev has expressed interest in strengthening its position as a key transit hub in Eurasian logisticsvi.
Because of these changes, the nature of relationships has begun to change, and actors in Eurasia have become pragmatic. For instance, the India-Russia relations. According to Dimitri Trenin, the bedrock of this bilateral partnership was the military-technical partnership. However, in the second decade of the 21st Century, the economic cooperation between the two nations improved considerably. At the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, a new energy pillar was emboldened in the Indo-Russia relations. Because of sanctions, India became the conduit for Russian crude to the rest of the worldvii. India’s bilateral trade with Russia surged from $12 billion in 2021 to $65 billion in 2024. Even with the increase in sanctions, both countries have created bilateral mechanisms to continue trade. Russian insurance giants such as Ingosstrakh and AlfaStrakhovanie provided insurance to Indian crude imports from Russia. It was interesting to note that a rapid de-dollarisation occurred in New Delhi’s trade with Russia. Both countries settled payments in rupees, dirhams, yuan, and other non-western currencies. Thus, significant growth has been observed in Eurasian trade due to the increasing investment in logistics, alternative banking mechanisms, and plans for the digitalisation of currencies. What is further interesting is that in recent years, BRICS has played an important role in setting the discourse for the creation of an alternative world orderviii; however, drawing blueprints to realise visions will require significant effort from all stakeholders. However, several challenges remain.
Challenges
Three challenges act as an impediment to Eurasian connectivity. First is the geopolitical risks that hamper connectivity projects. India’s bilateral concerns with China and a lack of agreement on the borders led to strained relations, which is why New Delhi remained among the few countries in Asia that did not join the BRI, another reason for which was the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a part of BRI traversed through contested territory claimed by India, New Delhi’s concerns with Beijing and Islamabad resulted in a lack of long-term economic cooperation. Further, the South Asian region has the poorest connectivity in the world. Despite increasing tourism, business interests remain low. Further concerns emerge regarding the strategic stability of Eurasia, the Nagarno Karabakh conflict, and the post-conflict restoration of Afghanistan, which are some of the difficulties. Further, in the case of INSTC, despite the impetus, it took more than 23 years to begin trial runs because of US sanctions on Iran. Further, even on the EMC, the scale of operations is low, and firms continue to use the Mumbai -St Petersburg sea route.
Second is the restraints in the creation of an alternative geoeconomic order, caused externally because of the threat of Western sanctions and even with increasing demands for the use of national currencies across Eurasia and to create alternative payment systems, the threat of secondary sanctions acts as an impediment. Creating a new payment system is not easy and will have to evolve, with states needing to agree on standards and codes, which will not be easy in the short term. Third, logistical concerns persist in throwing a spanner in the works; for instance, in the case of the NSR, even though there is a strong political will for cooperation, the number of capable icebreakers is insufficient. Other concerns, such as the influx and shortages of shipping containers, can cause issues in multimodal transit corridors. Thus, addressing these concerns requires strong political will and capacity among partners, which is, at times, absent.
Way forward
In recent years, connectivity in Eurasia has sparked considerable interest in global geoeconomics. With centres of power shifting to Asia, a political-economic shift has been taking place in Eurasia as countries increasingly invest in fostering trade, investment, and cooperation as the pivot to Asia takes place. Initiatives like INSTC, BRI, and corridors such as the NSR and the Eastern Maritime corridor under the flag of the Greater Eurasian Partnership have strengthened integration while challenging the Western-led order. Despite progress, challenges remain, including geopolitical tensions, border disputes, and sanctions. Thus, building an alternative geoeconomic framework requires financial and political coordination.
Nevertheless, the continued push for connectivity highlights its strategic importance. With cooperation and pragmatic diplomacy, Eurasia can shape a more resilient and interconnected future in an increasingly multipolar world.
Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Research Assistant at Observer Research Assistant at the Observer Research Foundation and a PhD Candidate at the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University
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